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"ICING" ON THE CAKE: ALLOWING AMATEUR ATHLETIC
PROMOTERS TO ESCAPE LIABILITY IN
MOHNEY v. USA HOCKEY, INC.
I. INTRODUCTION
Amateur athletics are a major attraction for today's youth.1
With such a large enrollment in the various amateur sports availa-
ble to youngsters, injuries are unavoidable. 2 For example, approxi-
mately 25,000 people each year require emergency room treatment
for injuries sustained while playing hockey.3 While some sports' in-
juries are unavoidable, others are a direct consequence of pro-
moter error.4 The question then arises as to whether a parent can
recover damages for injuries sustained by their child in an amateur
athletic sport. In the case of clear negligence by the amateur
league or coach, one expects that a parent should be able to re-
cover for injuries sustained by their child. 5 Youth athletic leagues,
however, have increased the use of release agreements in which the
parents and the child expressly assume the risks involved in the
sport.6 These release agreements, coupled with the assumption of
the risk doctrine, have enabled amateur athletic leagues to escape
liability from injured athletes who assert negligence claims.7 The
inequities of allowing amateur athletic leagues to escape liability is
arguably contrary to public policy because the leagues will no
1. See ToM APPENZELLER, YOUTH SPORT AND THE LAW 12 (2000) (estimating at
least 25 million young people from five to eighteen years of age are participating
in youth athletics).
2. See Mario R. Arango & William R. Trueba, Jr., The Sports Chamber: Exculpa-
tory Agreements Under Pressure, 14 U. MiAMi ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. 1, 2 (1996) (ex-
plaining that increased popularity of various sports creates risk of increased
litigation because of injuries occurring in these sports).
3. See JEFFREY K. RIFFER, SPORTS AND RECREATIONAL INJURIES § 2.17, at 155
(1985) (discussing injuries sustained in various recreational activities).
4. See Laura J. Perkins, Comment, A Practical Guide to Recovery for Injured Air
Sport Participants, 62 J. AIR L. & COM. 559, 560 (1996) (noting recovery for pro-
moter error limited due to judicial tolerance of exculpatory agreements).
5. For a discussion of basic negligence principles, see infra notes 34-37 and
accompanying text.
6. For a discussion of express assumption of the risk, see infra notes 51-59 and
accompanying text.
7. See Perkins, supra note 4, at 560 (noting recovery in negligence for pro-
moter error limited due to judicial tolerance of exculpatory agreements between
service providers and participants).
(417)
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longer be compelled to promote and ensure the safety of the young
and naive.8
This Note examines the application of the assumption of the
risk doctrine and the enforceability of a standard exculpatory agree-
ment as set forth specifically in Mohney v. USA Hockey, Inc.9 Section
II paints the factual setting for the application of the assumption of
the risk doctrine in an ice hockey game and the standard exculpa-
tory agreement signed prior to participation in that game.10 Sec-
tion III describes the complex legal background behind the
assumption of the risk doctrine and the validity of exculpatory
agreements.1" Section IV delineates the reasoning espoused by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in holding that
the plaintiff assumed the risks of the hockey game and the valid,
signed exculpatory agreement precluded recovery from all defend-
ants, except the equipment manufacturers.1 2 Section V critically
analyzes the Sixth Circuit's application of express assumption of the
risk and its enforcement of the signed exculpatory agreement. 13 Fi-
nally, Section VI examines the implications of the decision exempt-
ing negligent amateur athletic promoters from liability and the
potential future harm this decision will have on the safety of an
already dangerous sport.1 4
II. FACTS
From May 20-21, 1995, the Toledo Cherokees held an amateur
ice hockey developmental camp in Sylvania, Ohio for hockey play-
ers between the ages of sixteen and twenty. 15 The developmental
camp chose to play under National Hockey League ("NHL") Rules,
8. For a discussion of the public policy implications of exculpatory agree-
ments, see infra notes 115-25 and accompanying text.
9. No. 00-3105, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3584, at *11-23 (6th Cir. Mar. 1, 2001),
affg in part, rev'g in part, 77 F. Supp. 2d 859, 864 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
10. For a discussion of the facts of Mohney, see infra notes 15-33 and accompa-
nying text.
11. For a discussion of the background of assumption of the risk and exculpa-
tory agreements used in the Mohney decision, see infra notes 34-125 and accompa-
nying text.
12. For a discussion of the narrative analysis, see infra notes 126-47 and ac-
companying text.
13. For a discussion of the critical analysis, see infra notes 148-214 and accom-
panying text.
14. For a discussion of the impact of the Mohney decision, see infra notes 215-
21 and accompanying text.
15. See Mohney v. USA Hockey, Inc., No. 00-3105, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
3584, at *4 (6th Cir. Mar. 1, 2001). The Toledo Cherokees, Jr. Club is a junior B
Level amateur hockey team that is a member of the Central States Hockey League
("CSHL"). See Mohney v. USA Hockey, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 859, 863 (N.D. Ohio
[Vol. 9: p. 417
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which differ from USA Hockey Rules regarding an infraction
known as "icing the puck."16 The NHL plays by "touch icing" rules,
whereby a player on the team shooting the puck across the oppos-
ing team's goal line can prevent an adverse icing call by gaining
control of the puck before anyone on the opposing team touches
the puck.1 7 On the other hand, USA Hockey plays by "automatic
icing" rules, whereby an icing infraction is automatically whistled
once the puck crosses the opposing team's goal line.' 8
During a scrimmage on the second day of developmental
camp, Plaintiff Levi Mohney and Defendant Reneger were chasing
after an iced puck, as defined by the touch icing rule, when Re-
neger fell into Mohney from behind.19 Mohney and Reneger were
both racing towards the iced puck and heading quickly towards the
boards to be the first to touch the puck.20 Both players lost control
and slammed into the boards at the end of the rink.21 As Mohney's
face struck the boards, a clip on the cage of his facemask broke
off.22 As a result of the accident, Mohney suffered severe spinal
cord damage that left him quadriplegic. 23
USA Hockey requires that all participants in its programs sign
an Individual Membership Registration Form, containing a release
of liability clause as a precondition to participation. 24 Mohney and
1999). The CSHL is a regional arm of USA Hockey, Inc., the national governing
body of amateur hockey. See id.
16. See Mohney, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3584, at *4-5. "Icing the puck" occurs
when a player of a team, equal or greater in numerical strength to the opposing
team, shoots, bats or deflects the puck from his own half of the ice beyond the goal
line of the opposing team. See NHL O1FIcAL RuLEs R. 65(a).
17. See NHL OrFIcrAL RULES R. 65(a). Under "touch icing" rules, both teams
have an incentive to reach a loose puck first in order to cause or prevent an icing
infraction from being called. See Mohney, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3584, at *5.
18. See USA HocKEY OFFIci RuLEs R. 620(a) (3). Under "automatic icing"
rules, the incentive to chase a loose puck is lost because the icing infraction is
called no matter which team's player gets to the puck first. See Mohney, 2001 U.S.
App. LEXIS 3584, at *5.
19. See Mohney, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 864.
20. See id. (emphasizing touch icing increases likelihood of injury caused by
collision with "boards" at end of rink).
21. See id. (noting no penalty was called by referee).
22. See Mohney, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3584, at *5. Mohney had on a SK 2000
L helmet manufactured by Defendant Bauer and a facemask manufactured by De-
fendant Karhu. See Mohney, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 864.
23. See Mohney, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3584, at *4 (noting Mohney left para-
lyzed one week short of his eighteenth birthday).
24. See id. at *6. The Individual Membership Registration Form provides that
[u]pon entering events sponsored by USA Hockey and/or its member
districts, I/We agree to abide by the rules of USA Hockey as currently
published. I/We understand and appreciate that participation or obser-
vation of the sport constitutes a risk to me/us of serious injury, including
2002]
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his father had signed similar release forms in the past, as well as
before entering the 1994-95 hockey season.2 5
The plaintiffs filed suit against Reneger, USA Hockey, the Cen-
tral States Hockey League ("CSHL"), the Cherokees, Karhu and
Bauer to recover for Mohney's physical injuries.26 Plaintiffs
claimed that Reneger recklessly checked Mohney from behind.27
Additionally, the plaintiffs claimed that USA Hockey, CSHL and the
Cherokees failed to warn players of the dangers involved in check-
ing from behind and playing under the touch icing rules. 28 Fur-
ther, plaintiffs raised product liability claims against Karhu and
Bauer, manufacturers of the faceguard and helmet worn by Moh-
ney.29 The plaintiffs argued that assumption of the risk was inappli-
cable under the factual scenario and the release agreement was
unenforceable. 30 According to the plaintiffs, therefore, recovery
for damages could not be precluded.3'
In Mohney, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the granting of summary
judgment for the defendant team player and all of the hockey de-
fendants because Mohney had assumed the risk of the sport and
signed a valid release agreement, making the hockey defendants
only liable for wanton and willful actions.32 The Sixth Circuit re-
permanent paralysis or death. I/We voluntarily and knowingly recognize,
accept, and assume the risk and release USA Hockey, its Affiliates, their
sponsors, event organizers and officials from any liability therefore.
Id.
25. See Mohney, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 863 (explaining because Levi Mohney was
minor at time of registration, his father was also required to sign each release
form).
26. See id. at 864; see also Jeffrey M. Schalley, Eliminate Violence from Sports
Through Arbitration, Not the Civil Courts, 8 SPORTS LAw. J. 181, 202 (2001) (noting
plaintiffs claimed that exculpatory agreement signed "did not cover the brand of
hockey that was being played that day").
27. See Mohney, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 864.
28. See id. (noting plaintiffs claim defendants should have instructed players
of dangers involved in checking from behind).
29. See id.
30. See id. at 864-65 (noting defendants moved for summary judgment based
on assumption of risk).
31. See id. Plaintiffs asserted numerous reasons at the district court level why
the release agreement, admittedly signed, should not be enforced including: (1)
the release was signed in Indianapolis, Indiana and did not include a game played
in Toledo, Ohio that occurred after the conclusion of the regular season; (2) the
release did not include or expressly mention claims based on strict liability against
equipment manufacturers; (3) the release lacked the requisite sufficient considera-
tion; (4) the release was vague; (5) the plaintiffs lacked the proper understanding
and explanation of the release; (6) USA Hockey had a statutory duty to warn play-
ers about sports safety and (7) the release did not bind Levi Mohney's mother
because she never signed the release agreement. See id. at 873-76.
32. See Mohney v. USA Hockey, Inc., No. 00-3105, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
3584, at *3, 17 (6th Cir. Mar. 1, 2001). The district court granted all of the defend-
[Vol. 9: p. 417
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versed and remanded the product liability claims against the
hockey manufacturers, finding that the plain language of the re-
lease agreement did not preclude claims for defective equipment.33
III. BACKGROUND
A. The Assumption of the Risk Doctrine
1. Basic Negligence Principles in Sporting Events
Under normal circumstances, a person who owes a duty of care
to others could be held liable for careless conduct that causes injury
to another. 34 Generally, individuals engaged in recreational activi-
ties owe a duty of reasonable care to the participants.3 5 Whether a
participant's injury causing conduct constitutes actionable negli-
gence involves a fact specific inquiry that is decided on a case-by-
case basis.3 6
A case-by-case analysis includes the consideration of material
factors including
the specific game involved, the ages and physical attributes
of the participants, their respective skills of the game and
ants' motions for summaryjudgment holding that (1) the defendant hockey player
was not liable because Mohney has assumed the risk of the sport and the defen-
dant's failure to avoid a collision with Mohney was not done recklessly or inten-
tionally, and (2) the defendants hockey organizations and equipment
manufacturers were precluded from liability under the release agreement signed
by the plaintiffs because the defendants' misconduct was not done willfully or wan-
tonly. See Mohney, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 877-78.
33. See Mohney, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3584, at *26. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the equipment manufacturers, finding that the re-
lease agreement signed by the plaintiffs barred any claims because the manufactur-
ers were "sponsors" of USA Hockey. See Mohney, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 874. The Sixth
Circuit reversed and remanded in order to allow plaintiffs' product liability claims
to proceed. See Mohney, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3584, at *26.
34. See Mohney, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 871. THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
defines negligence as "conduct which falls below the standard established by law
for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm. It does not include
conduct recklessly disregardful of an interest of others." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 282 (1965). Generally speaking
[i]n most cases, the standard against which any particular act or omission
must be tested to determine whether it is negligent is the conduct ex-
pected of an ordinary, reasonable person under like circumstances. In
other words, negligence is either the failure to do something that would
have been done by a reasonable person, guided by those considerations
that ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, or doing some-
thing that the prudent and reasonable person would not do.
Cym H. Lowell, Liability for Injuries in Sports Activities, in LAw & AMATEUR SPORTS 40,
41 (Ronald J. Waicukauski ed., 1982).
35. See RiFFER, supra note 3, § 2.01, at 84.
36. See id. (suggesting close look at facts of each case to determine negli-
gence).
2002]
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their knowledge of its rules and customs, their status as
amateurs or professionals, the type of risks which are in-
herent in the game and those which are outside the realm
of reasonable anticipation, the presence or absence of
protective uniforms or equipment, and the degree of zest
with which the game is being played.37
2. Basic Assumption of the Risk Principles in Sporting Events
A person who voluntarily chooses to participate in a sport is
said to assume the ordinary risks of the sport, thereby precluding
recovery for any resulting injury. 38 Although sports participants as-
sume the risk of injury from the sport itself, the participants do not
assume the risk of injury from a violation of the general rules of the
game. 3
9
In the sports arena, conduct that might be viewed as a breach
of a duty of care under normal circumstances is a regular occur-
rence and an integral part of sports.40 While most jurisdictions crit-
icize or disregard the assumption of the risk doctrine, cases
37. Id. at 84-85.
38. See W.R. Habeeb, Annotation, Liability for Injury To or Death of Participant in
Game or Contest, 7 A.L.R. 2D 704, 707 (1949). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS states generally that "a plaintiff who voluntarily assumes a risk of harm aris-
ing from the negligent or reckless conduct of the defendant cannot recover for
such harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965). In the sporting
context,
[a] voluntary participant in any lawful game, sport, or contest, in legal
contemplation by the fact of his or her participation, assumes all risk inci-
dental to the particular game, sport, or contest which are obvious and
foreseeable; but he or she does not assume an extraordinary risk which is
not normally incident to the game, sport, or amusement activity unless he
or she knows about it and voluntarily assumes it.
27A AM. JUR. 2D Entertainment and Sports Law § 97 (1996).
39. See Habeeb, supra note 38, at 707. The general rule is that:
Taking part in a game manifests a willingness to submit to such bodily
contacts or restrictions of liberty as are permitted by its rules or usages.
Participating in a game does not manifest consent to contacts which are
prohibited by rules or usages of the game if such rules or usages are de-
signed to protect the participants and not merely to secure the better
playing of the game as a test of skill. This is true although the player
knows that those with or against whom he is playing are habitual violators
of such rules.
Kenneth W. Simons, Assumption of Risk and Consent in the Law of Torts: A Theory of
Full Preference, 67 B.U. L. REv. 213, 272 (1987) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 50 cmt. b (1965)).
40. See Mohney v. USA Hockey, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 859, 871 (N.D. Ohio
1999). "Injuries are a regular occurrence in many sports, such as football and
hockey. Moreover, one who plays baseball, tennis, volleyball, soccer, basketball, or
golf is subjected to risk of harm from balls struck or thrown travelling at considera-
ble speed." Id. (quoting Thompson v. McNeill, 559 N.E.2d 705, 707 (Ohio 1990)).
(Vol. 9: p. 417
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involving injury in lawful sports have generally taken the stance that
participants assume the risks "incident to the contest which are ob-
vious and foreseeable." 41 In determining whether a plaintiff as-
sumes the risk,
[t]he court would consider the experience and under-
standing of the plaintiff - whether the plaintiff had rea-
sonable opportunity to abandon or leave the situation or
to take an alternative course available to him, and whether
a person of ordinary prudence, under the circumstances,
would have refused to continue and would have aban-
doned that course of conduct or that activity.42
In states that have adopted the assumption of the risk doctrine
for sports, an individual must demonstrate that the other partici-
pant acted recklessly or intentionally in order to recover for an in-
jury.43 Although the participant in the sport assumes risks
ordinarily incident to the sport, he or she does not assume the risk
of intentional or negligent infliction of injury.44
41. Stanley L. Grazis, Annotation, Liability of Participant in Team Athletic Compe-
tition for Injury to or Death of Another Participant, 55 A.L.R. 5TH 529, 538 (1998).
42. JAMES A. BALEY & DAVID L. MATTHEWS, LAW AND LIABILITY IN ATHLETICS,
PHYSICAL EDUCATION, AND RECREATION 59 (2d ed. 1989) ("One who knows of a
danger arising from the act or omission of another and understands risk there-
from, and who nevertheless voluntarily exposes himself to it, is precluded from
recovering for an injury that results from the exposure.").
43. See Mohney, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 871 (citing Marchetti v. Kalish, 559 N.E.2d
699, 703-04 (Ohio 1990), which held when participants engage in sporting activity,
they assume ordinary risks of activity and cannot recover for injuries unless other
participant's actions were reckless or intentional). The general rule is that
[a] sporting event participant is not liable for ordinary careless conduct
engaged in during the sport, but only for intentionally injuring another
player or engaging in reckless conduct that is totally outside the range of
ordinary activity involved in the sport. This is so because in the heat of an
active sporting event, a participant's normal energetic conduct often in-
cludes accidentally careless behavior, and vigorous participation in sport-
ing events might be chilled if legal liability were to be imposed on a
participant on the basis of his or her ordinary careless conduct. In such a
sport, even when a participant's conduct violates a rule of the game and
may subject the violator to internal sanctions prescribed by the sport it-
self, imposition of legal liability for such conduct might well alter funda-
mentally the nature of the sport by deterring participants from vigorously
engaging in activity that falls close to, but on the permissible side of, a
prescribed rule.
57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 68 (1989 & Supp. 2001).
44. See WALTER T. CHAMPION, JR., FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAW § 7.1, at 130
(1990) ("Generally, participants will assume the risks of unintentional injuries suf-
fered at the hands of another participant, but will not assume the risk of injuries
either inflicted intentionally or as the result of a disregard for safety."); Habeeb,
supra note 38, at 716.
2002]
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3. Types of Assumption of the Risk
Assumption of the risk doctrine is divided into primary as-
sumption of the risk and secondary assumption of the risk. 45 Pri-
mary assumption of the risk involves cases where the defendant has
no duty of care to protect the plaintiff from the risk of injury.46
Under primary assumption of the risk, "[t]he question whether the
defendant has a legal duty to protect the plaintiff from a particular
risk of harm turns solely on the nature of the activity in which the
defendant is engaged and the relationship of the defendant and
the plaintiff to that activity or sport."47
Alternatively, secondary assumption of the risk occurs when
the defendant owes a duty of care to the plaintiff, but the plaintiff
knowingly accepts the risk created by the defendant's breach of this
duty.48 Under secondary assumption of the risk, plaintiffs cannot
recover for injuries if the plaintiffs unreasonably accepted the risk
under the totality of the circumstances. 49 In the context of sports
and recreational activities, primary assumption of the risk is the ap-
plicable doctrine. 50
Express assumption of the risk represents a contract-based
form of primary assumption of the risk, in which "the plaintiff, in
advance, gives express consent to relieve the defendant of an obli-
gation of conduct toward him .... The result is that the defendant
is relieved of legal duty to the plaintiff; and being under no duty, he
cannot be charged with negligence." 51 Express assumption of the
45. See Mohney, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 871 (citing 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 21.1 (1st ed. 1956); PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 68 (5th ed. 1984)).
46. See id.
47. Id. (citing Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 704 (Cal. 1992); Marchetti, 559
N.E.2d at 703); see also Ammie I. Roseman-Orr, Comment, Recreational Activity Lia-
bility in Hawai'i: Are Waivers Worth the Paper on Which They Are Written?, 21 U. HAw. L.
REv. 715, 720-21 (1999) (noting primary assumption of risk exists in sports arena
when plaintiff voluntarily participates in activity and reasonably knows activity in-
volves risk).
48. See Mohney, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 872; Roseman-Orr, supra note 47, at 721
(noting secondary assumption of risk, also known as unreasonable assumption of
risk, centers on whether plaintiff unreasonably assumed known danger).
49. See Rosemann-Orr, supra note 47, at 721 (noting that in some jurisdictions
secondary assumption of risk has been merged with comparative negligence).
50. See Mohney, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 872; Parker v. Centre Group Ltd. P'ship, No.
95-1126, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 33694, at *10 (4th Cir. Dec. 4, 1995) (holding
negligence claim by professional hockey player injured during hockey barred be-
cause he assumed risk of being checked).
51. Mohney, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 872 (quoting PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 68
(5th ed. 1984)). In one jurisdiction:
The California appellate court has defined an express assumption of the
risk as one "when the [participant], in advance, expressly consents ... to
relieve the [provider] of an obligation of conduct toward him, and to
[Vol. 9: p. 417
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risk commonly takes the form of an exculpatory or release agree-
ment in which one party contracts "to abandon or relinquish a
claim, obligation or cause of action against another party."52 By
express consent, the participant agrees to accept the chance of in-
jury from a known or possible risk, relieving another of the obliga-
tion to exercise reasonable care for their protection. 53 Under
express assumption of the risk, therefore, the participant in a sport-
ing event or recreational activity can contract away his or her right
to a negligence claim against the proprietor; but the participant
can still recover for the proprietor's wanton or willful conduct.
54
A typical example of a party expressly assuming the risk would
be the case of McPherson v. Sunset Speedway, Inc.55 In McPherson, the
plaintiff was injured when a racing car lost control and entered the
infield area where the plaintiff and other spectators were stand-
take his chances of injury from a known risk arising from what the [pro-
vider] is to do or leave undone ... . The result is that... being under no
duty, [the provider] cannot be charged with negligence."
Arango & Trueba, supra note 2, at 8 (quoting Saenz v. Whitewater Voyages, Inc.,
226 Cal. App. 3d 758, 764 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS describes express assumption of the risk as when
[T]he plaintiff has given his express consent to relieve the defendant of
an obligation to exercise care for his protection, and agrees to take his
chances as to injury from a known or possible risk. The result is that the
defendant, who would otherwise be under a duty to exercise such care, is
relieved of that responsibility, and is no longer under any duty to protect
the plaintiff.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A cmt. cl (1965).
52. Arango & Trueba, supra note 2, at 7 (discussing commonly used exculpa-
tory agreements). Sport and recreational activity proprietors generally require
participants to sign release agreements, therefore, the proprietors allocate the risk
of injury to the participant and relieve themselves of possible personal injury costs.
See Roseman-Orr, supra note 47, at 724 (noting before Hawaii Recreational Activity
Liability Statute was enacted to expand sport participant rights, exculpatory agree-
ments were considered valid in state unless attacked under contract theory).
53. See Lowell, supra note 34, at 42 (noting clearest example of express as-
sumption of risk in sports arena involves contractual agreement between partici-
pant and sports promoter in which participant assumes risk inherent to particular
sport).
54. See Mohney, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 872 (citing Cain v. Cleveland Parachute
Training Ctr., 457 N.E.2d 1185, 1187 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983)); Pruett v. Am. Motor-
cycle Ass'n, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 11891, at *10 (7th Cir. May 17, 1995) (holding
under Illinois law, plaintiffs claim for willful and wanton misconduct cannot be
contractually released); James C. Kozlowski, Liability Waivers and Releases Overview:
Can You Say Exculpatoy Agreement?, 31 NAT'L. REcREATION & PARK ASS'N L. REv. 30,
30 (1996) (noting willful and wanton misconduct, sometimes referred to as "gross
negligence," goes beyond carelessness and involves misconduct performed in utter
disregard for well being of party).
55. 594 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1979).
2002]
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ing.5 6 The plaintiff had been a stock car owner and racer; therefore
the plaintiff was aware of the inherent risks involved in racing.
5 7
Further, the plaintiffs admission to the infield area was condi-
tioned on the signing of a waiver and release agreement.58 The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that under Nebraska
law the express assumption of the risk doctrine was a complete de-
fense to the negligence action. 59
4. Application of the Assumption of the Risk Doctrine
A critical factor in determining whether the assumption of the
risk doctrine applies is whether an inherent risk was involved.60 An
inherent risk, as defined by one state statute, generally includes
"those dangers or conditions which are characteristic of, intrinsic
to, or an integral part of any sport or recreational activity."6 1 As a
general rule, participants in an athletic event assume and are re-
sponsible only for the natural and ordinary risks of the game, but
not the non-obvious or extraordinary risks.62 An assumption of un-
56. See id. at 712. The general public is normally admitted into the grand-
stand area, but for an additional charge, individuals were admitted into the infield.
See id. at 714.
57. See id. at 714-15.
58. See id. at 712 (explaining plaintiff had ample time to read release
agreement).
59. See id. at 715 (finding plaintiff should have comprehended risk that was
clear and obvious to him).
60. See Cooperman v. David, 214 F.3d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding
injury caused by slipping saddle due to loose cinch was inherent risk in horseback
riding).
61. Id. (quoting Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-122 (1998)); see also Mohney v. USA
Hockey, Inc., No. 00-3105, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3584, at *12 (6th Cir. Mar. 1,
2001) (noting determination of inherent risk of athletic event hinges on circum-
stances of sport and way particular sport played).
62. See Cooperman, 214 F.3d at 1165; Mauner v. Feinstein, 623 N.Y.S.2d 326,
328 (N.Y. 1995) (holding summary judgment inappropriate because participation
by adult counselors in rugby contest unreasonably increased risk of injury to minor
participants); Caroline R. Krivacka & Paul D. Krivacka, Annotation, Tort Liability of
Public Schools and Institutions of Higher Learning for Accidents Occurring During School
Athletic Events, 68 A.L.R. 5th 663, 677 (1999). Generally,
voluntary... participants in lawful sporting activities assume, as a matter
of law, all of the ordinary and inherent risks in the sport, as long as the
activity is played in good faith and the injury is not the result of an inten-
tional or willful act .... [T] he general rule will be inapplicable where the
injured participant can establish that the injuries were either the result of
other than good faith competition or the product of risks that are not
ordinary or inherent in the sport in question.
Lowell, supra note 34, at 4244. Hockey players do not assume unknown risks. See
RIFFER, supra note 3, § 9.16, at 486 (citing Berman v. Phila. Bd. of Educ., 456 A.2d
545, 550 (Pa. Super. 1983), which held that children unable to appreciate and
assume risk of floor hockey due to lack of intelligence, experience and
information).
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known risks, however, shall not be inferred.6 3 The type of negli-
gence that the participant expressly agrees to excuse the promoter
from "need[s] not be foreseen with absolute clarity, however, such
acts cannot lie beyond the reasonable contemplation of the
parties.
64
Whether a party has assumed the risks inherent in a sport or
recreational activity "includes consideration of the participant's
knowledge and experience in the activity generally."6 5 A knowing
assumption of the risk is dependent upon whether the plaintiff had
actual knowledge of the risk or whether that knowledge could be
inferred because the participant made certain observations and
should have reasonably identified the risk. 66 Additionally, the
plaintiff must know the existence of the inherent risk and appreci-
ate its unreasonable character.6 7 Furthermore, the plaintiff will not
have consented to the assumption of the risk if he fails to compre-
hend the risk involved because of age or lack of information or
experience. 6 8 Whether a participant in a sport has the awareness
and appreciation of the apparent risks is not to be determined in a
63. See Linda P. Bell, Note, The Heavy Weight of the Health Club Waiver, 21 T.
MARsHALL L. REv. 229, 246 (1995) (noting participant must foresee possible dan-
gers in order to minimize risk by altering conduct).
64. Id. at 245 (citing Larsen v. Vic Tanny Int'l, 474 N.E.2d 729, 732 (Il. App.
Ct. 1984), holding inhalation of dangerous gaseous vapor was outside scope of
injuries contemplated by parties in health club exculpatory agreement).
65. Goodlett v. Kalishek, 223 F.3d 32, 36 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Turcotte v.
Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964, 969 (N.Y. 1986), which denied negligence claim of exper-
ienced jockey after horse racing accident); see also Vandervelde v. United States,
No. 98-018, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1710, at *15 (Wyo. Feb. 1, 1999) (holding inher-
ent risk is issue of fact for jury and not to be decided on summary judgment).
66. See CHAMPION, supra note 44, § 10.1, at 187 (noting in order to assume
risk, participant must "understand and appreciate the risk involved and must ac-
cept the risk as well as the inherent possibility of the danger which could result
from that risk").
67. See Wicker v. Consol. Rail Corp., 142 F.3d 690, 702 (3d Cir. 1998) (hold-
ing exculpatory agreement attempting to settle claims regardless of whether par-
ties were aware of potential risks unenforceable); Wells v. Colo. Coll., 478 F.2d 158,
161 (10th Cir. 1973) (holding assumption of risk inapplicable where unable to
prove plaintiff anticipated extraordinary hazard); Grazis, supra note 41, at 538
(noting assumption of risk requires person assuming risk to have actual knowledge
and appreciation of danger).
68. See Lowell, supra note 34, at 44 (noting lack of skill or improper conduct
in sport may create unreasonable risk unable to be assumed); Krivacka & Krivacka,
supra note 62, at 677 (explaining courts will look to "age, experience, and intelli-
gence of the plaintiff to determine whether the plaintiff is capable of assuming any
risk"). A minor's assumption of the risk "will be tested by the child's maturity and
capacity to evaluate the circumstances surrounding him, with due consideration
given to the child's age, intelligence and experience." Anthony S. McCaskey &
Kenneth W. Biedzynski, A Guide To the Legal Liability of Coaches for a Sports Partici-
pant's Injuries, 6 SETON HALLJ. SPORT L. 7, 46 (1996) (noting some commentators
argue assumption of risk not effective defense against claims made by minors).
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vacuum. 69 Rather, the awareness of the risk in the sports arena is
assessed according to the background of a participant's skill and
experience, imputing a higher degree of awareness for a profes-
sional athlete than an amateur athlete.
70
B. Releasing Liability Through Exculpatory Agreements
1. Basic Exculpatory Agreement Principles
Due to the substantial risk of injury in sporting events, those
sponsoring events will typically seek to obtain a release from any
liability arising from the sport.7 1 These releases, also termed excul-
patory agreements, normally seek "to release the promoter, or
other party, from any and all liability resulting from any loss that
may be sustained by the athlete during the event in question.
7 2
The exculpatory agreement typically states that if the participant is
injured or killed, the participant will not hold the provider
responsible. 73
Exculpatory agreements are "contractual efforts to shift the
risk of damages from the negligent party to the injured party, with
the injured party having expressly agreed to accept that risk."'7 4 Ex-
culpatory agreements place the established principle of freedom to
contract in tension with the basic principle that a party should bear
the responsibility for its own negligence. 7 5 Nonetheless, partici-
69. See CHAMPION, supra note 44, § 7.6, at 141 (noting subjective state of par-
ticipant's mind and knowledge is essential in determining assumption of risk);
Bell, supra note 63, at 245 (explaining that actual or implied knowledge of risk
involved is vital ingredient to knowing assumption of risk).
70. See Parker Ctr. Group Ltd. P'ship, No. 95-1126, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
33694, at *9 (4th Cir. Dec. 4, 1995) (citing Maddox v. City of N.Y., 487 N.E.2d 553,
556-57 (N.Y. 1985), which held professional baseball player aware of risk involved
in playing on wet and muddy baseball field).
71. See Lowell, supra note 34, at 52 (suggesting application of contract law to
releases).
72. Id. (indicating effect of exculpatory agreement is to shift responsibility
from one party to another).
73. See Roseman-Orr, supa note 47, at 725-26 (noting promoters continue to
use exculpatory agreements to deter lawsuits even though they tend to believe they
are unenforceable).
74. Karen M. Espaldon, Virginia's Rule of Non-Waiver of Liability for Negligent
Acts: Hiett v. Lake Barcroft Cmty. Assoc., Inc., 2 GEO. MASON L. REv. 27, 29 (1994).
75. See CHAMPION, supra note 44, § 11.2, at 206 (stressing exculpatory agree-
ments present conflict between contract rule that all persons should be free to
contract and negligence rule that tortfeasor should be responsible for negligent
acts resulting in injury); Espaldon, supra note 74, at 29 (explaining exculpatory
agreements attempt to allocate tort damage through contract mechanisms); Recent
Cases: Negligence - Exculpatory Clauses -School Districts Cannot Contract Out of Negli-
gence Liability in Interscholastic Athletics - Wagenblast v. Odessa School District, 102
HARV. L. REV. 729, 729 (1989).
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pants who sign exculpatory agreements may recover damages for
injuries sustained if they can invalidate the release of liability.76
2. The General Enforceability of Exculpatoiy Agreements
Exculpatory agreements have traditionally been disfavored in
the law.77 An exculpatory agreement exonerating a party from lia-
bility will be strictly construed against the party receiving the bene-
fit.78 Primarily, there are two reasons for this: "First, public policy
attempts to limit the effect of these provisions since they limit an
individual's responsibility for negligence. Second, writings are usu-
ally construed against their drafter .... Courts should not, how-
ever, strain the words used in the exculpatory provision to render
them inapplicable." 79 A major drawback of exculpatory agreements
is that they tend to encourage a lack of due care on the part of the
individual released from liability.80
Even when exculpatory agreements are formally drafted and
executed, their validity may be challenged according to "(1)
whether they are void as against public policy, (2) whether the re-
leasor knew and understood the risk being assumed, and (3)
whether the waiver was clear and unambiguous as to what was being
waived."81 Courts have invalidated these agreements for being
against public policy, improper drafting, print size, ambiguity and
language rendering the contract not understandable. 82
76. See Roseman-Orr, supra note 47, at 727 (explaining exculpatory agree-
ments typically subject to contract analysis in determining validity).
77. See id. at 725. "[TI he law frowns upon contracts intended to exculpate a
party from consequences of his own negligence and though, with certain excep-
tions, they are enforceable, such agreements are subject to close scrutiny."
Thomas A. Moore & Matthew Gaier, Courts Disfavor Exculpatory Releases, N.Y.L.J.,
Oct. 6, 1998, at 3 (citing Gross v. Sweet, 400 N.E.2d 306, 308 (N.Y. 1979)), which
held exculpatory agreement signed by parachute jumper did not release defen-
dant from liability for negligence).
78. See CHAMPION, supra note 44, § 11.2, at 208 (noting exculpatory agree-
ments strictly construed against benefiting parties because they are not favored by
courts and any clause overly ambiguous is not enforceable).
79. RIFFER, supra note 3, § 10.01, at 515-16.
80. See BALEY & MArr-HEWS, supra note 42, at 56 (noting exculpatory agree-
ments provide no incentive for promoters to actively prevent negligence).
81. Roseman-Orr, supra note 47, at 725 (explaining several grounds to chal-
lenge validity of exculpatory agreements).
82. See Arango & Trueba, supra note 2, at 10; McCaskey & Biedzynski, supra
note 68, at 60 (explaining exculpatory agreements generally disfavored by courts
of law). Generally,
[f] or waivers to remain enforceable they must clearly define which claims
or rights are being released. This and the following three conditions
should help insulate a waiver from judicial review: (1) an intent to excuse
one party from the consequences of his own negligence must be ex-
pressed in clear, definite and unambiguous language; (2) the contract
2002]
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In order to be enforceable, "the waiving party must have had
an opportunity to know the terms of the release."' 3 To be valid, the
wording of the exculpatory agreement must be unambiguous and
understandable.8 4 The exculpatory agreement "should contain
clear, explicit, and unequivocal language referencing the types of
activities, circumstances or situations that it encompasses."8 5 Fur-
thermore, the exculpatory agreement "must [convey] plainly and
precisely that the 'limitation of liability extends to negligence or
other fault of the party attempting to shed his ordinary responsibil-
ity.' "86 However, not every possible act of negligence on the part of
the provider needs to be explicit in the exculpatory agreement.8 7
When applying the applicable state law, circuit courts have up-
held the validity of exculpatory agreements in the sports and recre-
ation arena if the agreements are clear and unambiguous.88 In
Campbell v. Country Club Stables, Inc.,89 the Seventh Circuit, in apply-
ing Illinois law, upheld an exculpatory agreement after the plaintiff
was thrown from a horse while taking riding lessons.90 In Waggoner
v. Nags Head Water Sports, Inc.,91 the Fourth Circuit, applying mari-
must have been made at arm's length with no vast disparity of bargaining
power between the parties; and (3) the exculpation must not be against
public policy in the circumstances of the case.
Schalley, supra note 26, at 201.
83. Lowell, supra note 34, at 53 (explaining enforceable exculpatory agree-
ment "must be conspicuous, result from free and open bargaining, and its express
terms must be applicable to particular misconduct of party whose potential liability
is waived").
84. See RIFFER, supra note 3, § 10.01, at 516 (noting party being bound by ex-
culpatory agreement "must not be compelled to resort to a magnifying glass and
lexicon").
85. Bell, supra note 63, at 239 (noting valid exculpatory agreement must state
participant agrees to relieve promoter from duty of care).
86. Moore & Gaier, supra note 77, at 3 (explaining exculpatory agreements
must include claims of negligence in understandable and unambiguous terms).
87. See Arango & Trueba, supra note 2, at 17 (stating "[a]lthough every possi-
ble risk need not be expressed, agreement must give participant general under-
standing of inherent dangers involved").
88. See Waggoner v. Nags Head Water Sports, Inc., No. 97-1394, 1998 U.S.
App. LEXIS 6792, at *17-24 (4th Cir. Apr. 6, 1998) (holding jet ski exculpatory
agreement did not violate policies of admiralty law, state law or general contract
law); Brooks v. Timberline Tours, Inc., 127 F.3d 1273, 1275 (10th Cir. 1997) (hold-
ing snowmobile exculpatory agreement enforceable because it was clear and un-
ambiguous); Campbell v. Country Club Stables, Inc., No. 89-2830, 1990 U.S. App.
LEXIS 11222, at *5-7 (7th Cir. July 2, 1990) (holding exculpatory agreement
signed by horse rider not contrary to public policy and enforceable).
89. No. 89-2830, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 11222 (7th Cir. July 2, 1990).
90. See id. at *5-7 (holding exculpatory agreement not contrary to public pol-
icy and plaintiff acknowledged risk of being thrown from horse). In Campbell, the
plaintiff had owned a pony and had ridden horses in the past. See id. at *2.
91. No. 97-1394, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 6792 (4th Cir. Apr. 6, 1998).
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time law, upheld an exculpatory agreement as unambiguous and
conspicuous after the plaintiff was injured in ajet skiing accident.92
In Brooks v. Timberline Tours, Inc.,93 the Tenth Circuit, applying Col-
orado law, upheld the validity of an unambiguous release agree-
ment even after plaintiffs son was killed in a snowmobile accident
while partaking in a snowmobile tour.94
Many courts have questioned the validity of exculpatory agree-
ments and refused to resolve their validity on a granting of sum-
mary judgment.95 In Juete v. Jarnowski,9 6 for example, the Seventh
Circuit in applying Illinois law, held that whether an alleged release
was obtained knowingly and fairly is a fact question for the jury to
decide.97 Further, in Anderson v. Eby,98 the Tenth Circuit, applying
Colorado law, held that the ambiguity of the language in an excul-
patory agreement signed by a snowmobile rider presented an issue
of material fact to which a motion for summary judgment should
have been denied. 99 In Ghionis v. Deer Valley Resort Company,100 the
District Court for the Central District of Utah, applying Utah law,
held that summary judgment was improper in a skiing accident case
because the plaintiff signed an ambiguous release before renting
92. See id. at *17-24 (holding exculpatory agreement comported with policies
of admiralty law, state law, or general contract law). Despite the plaintiffs inexpe-
rience with rental jet skis, the Tenth Circuit granted defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment based on its findings that the exculpatory agreement was valid. See
id. at *24.
93. 127 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. 1997).
94. See id. at 1274-75 (holding exculpatory agreement expressed clearly and
unambiguously intent of parties to preclude liability). Specifically, the Tenth Cir-
cuit found that the exculpatory agreement was written in clear, simple terms, free
of legal jargon, and that the release was neither long nor complicated. See id.
95. See Anderson v. Eby, 998 F.2d 858, 865 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that
meaning of ambiguous snowmobile contract terms is issue of fact to be determined
in same way as other factual issues under dispute);Juete v.Jamowski, 393 F.2d 513,
515 (7th Cir. 1968) (holding summary judgment improper for horse rider thrown
to ground because factual issues remained); Ghionis v. Deer Valley Resort Co., 839
F. Supp. 789, 793-94 (C.D. Utah 1993) (holding that wording of ski resort exculpa-
tory agreement ambiguous); Fasules v. D.D.B. Needham Worldwide, Inc., No. 89-
1078, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10573, at *15-16 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 1989) (holding
failure to make plaintiff aware of risks of whitewater rafting at time agreement was
signed rendered exculpatory agreement unenforceable).
96. 393 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1968).
97. See id. at 515 (finding summary judgment improper where defendant
thrown to ground mounting rented horse and factual issues remained). Specifi-
cally, the Seventh Circuit found that a factual issue remained as to whether the
circumstances upon which the plaintiff signed the exculpatory agreement made
the release binding. See id. at 514.
98. 998 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1993).
99. See id. at 865-66 (noting that meaning of ambiguous contract terms is issue
of fact to be determined in same way as other factual issues under dispute).
100. 839 F. Supp. 789 (C.D. Utah 1993).
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skis. 101 Finally, in Fasules v. D.D.B. Needham Worldwide, Inc., 1 02 the
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, applying Illinois
law, held that an ambiguous exculpatory agreement signed by a
whitewater rafter did not warrant summary judgment against the
plaintiff.103
3. Application of Exculpatoiy Agreements to Minors
Normally, when a minor is involved with a release, the law will
not bind the participant to the exculpatory agreement. 10 4 The fail-
ure to enforce exculpatory agreements against minors is true
whether the minor or the parent of the minor signed the release. 10 5
A child cannot waive his own rights, and the parents of the child
cannot waive rights for their child. 10 6 "The traditional contract rule
for minors is that they can disaffirm contracts unless they involve
the necessities of life, and since recreation is never viewed as a ne-
cessity, then exculpatory contracts that are signed by minors are
usually voidable.' 10 7
A majority of the case law indicates that exculpatory agree-
ments do not bar minors from recovering for negligence claims. 10 8
101. See id. at 793-94, 797 (holding scope ambiguous and "as is" language of
ski resort exculpatory agreement inconspicuous).
102. No. 89-1078, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10573 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 1989).
103. See id. at *15-16 (holding failure to warn and make plaintiff aware of risks
of whitewater rafting at time agreement was signed rendered ambiguous exculpa-
tory agreement unenforceable).
104. See CHAMPION, supra note 44, § 11.5, at 213; RIFFER, supra note 3, § 10.03,
at 523 (indicating juridictions nearly unanimous in holding that parent's signing
of exculpatory agreement on behalf of child does not prevent child from suing).
In contrast, the Ohio Supreme Court has taken the minority position that parents
are capable of waiving a minor's rights through exculpatory agreements. See Me-
linda Smith, Note, Tort Immunity for Volunteers in Ohio: Zivich v. Mentor Soccer
Club, Inc., 32 AKRON L. REV. 699, 716 (1999) (citing Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club,
Inc., 696 N.E.2d 201, 207-08 (Ohio 1998), upholding exculpatory agreement
signed by parent on child's behalf in order to encourage youth sports and pro-
mote volunteer services).
105. See CHAMPION, supra note 44, § 11.5, at 213 (citing Santangelo v. New
York, 411 N.Y.S.2d 666, 667 (App. Div. 1978), which held minor injured at ice
hockey clinic not bound by release signed by father exempting city and hockey
league from liability for injuries); RIFFER, supra note 3, § 10.03, at 523 (noting that
in some jurisdictions, parent's signing of exculpatory agreement on behalf of mi-
nor does not bar parent from later making claim).
106. See BALEY & MA-rrHEWS, supra note 42, at 56 (citing Doyle v. Bowdoin
Coll., 403 A.2d 1204, 1209 (Me. 1979), holding release signed by parent of minor
injured while playing floor hockey unenforceable because parent cannot waive mi-
nor's rights).
107. CHAMPION, supra note 44, § 11.5, at 214 (declaring contracts with minors
voidable even if minor misrepresents age).
108. See Scott v. Pac. W. Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 12 (Wash. 1992) (hold-
ing exculpatory agreement unenforceable against twelve-year old advanced skier);
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In Childress v. Madison County,10 9 for example, the Tennessee Court
of Appeals held that an exculpatory agreement signed by the
mother of a mentally retarded student did not waive the minor's
rights. 110 The Childress court concluded that "l[t] he law is clear that
a guardian cannot on behalf of an infant or incompetent, exculpate
or indemnify against liability those organizations which sponsor ac-
tivities for children and the mentally disabled.""' Further, in the
benchmark case, Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort,112 the Wash-
ington Supreme Court refused to enforce a clear and unambiguous
exculpatory agreement against a minor after he sustained severe
head injuries in a skiing accident at a commercial resort.113 The
Scott court held that "it is settled law in many jurisdictions that, ab-
sent judicial or statutory authority, parents have no authority to re-
lease a cause of action belonging to their child."114
4. Public Policy and Exculpatory Agreements
In determining the validity of exculpatory agreements, public
policy has been at the center of the debate.' 15 The notion of public
Childress v. Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1, 8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (holding ex-
culpatory agreement did not waive rights of mentally retarded student); see also
Arango & Trueba, supra note 2, at 45 (explaining minors present "unique legal
problem" when involved in high risk sports).
109. 777 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).
110. See id. at 8 (holding exculpatory agreement waived rights of mother, but
not minor's rights).
111. Id. at 7-8 (holding exculpatory agreement void to extent it released any
rights of minor against defendants).
112. 834 P.2d 6 (Wash. 1992).
113. See id. at 12 (noting exculpatory agreement signed by parent on behalf of
minor unenforceable and against public policy).
114. Id. at 11. The court reasoned that "in situations where parents are un-
willing or unable to provide for a seriously injured child, the child would have no
recourse against the negligent party to acquire resources needed for care and this
is true regardless of when relinquishment of the child's rights might occur." Id. at
12.
115. See Lowell, supra note 34, at 54 (noting that exculpatory agreements may
not be enforceable in jurisdictions where legislatures have created public policies
rendering exculpatory agreements unenforceable); Smith, supra note 104, at 712
(noting exculpatory agreement contrary to public interest will be invalidated).
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS defines when an exculpatory agree-
ment will be contrary to public policy as:
A term exempting a party from tort liability for harm caused negligently
is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if (a) the term exempts an
employer from liability to an employee for injury in the course of his
employment, (b) the term exempts one charged with a duty of public
service from liability to one to whom that duty is owed for compensation
for breach of that duty, or (c) the other party is similarly a member of a
class protected against the class to which the first party belongs.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195(2)(a)-(c) (1981).
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policy is a "principle of law which declares that no one may lawfully
do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public wel-
fare."'116 Public policy forbids an exculpatory agreement that a
party attempts to absolve itself of liability for its own negligence in
circumstances within its exclusive control.1 17 Furthermore, an ex-
culpatory agreement is contrary to public policy "if it unfairly re-
quires a person with little bargaining power to undertake
unreasonable risks which the person did not fully understand." 118
Whether an exculpatory agreement violates public policy is typically
made on a case-by-case basis. 119
In two companion cases, Wagenblast v. Odessa School District and
Vulliet v. Seattle Public School District,120 the Washington Supreme
Court examined two school districts' requirements that parents and
their children execute an exculpatory agreement before participa-
tion in interscholastic athletics.' 2' The Washington Supreme Court
held that releases relieving the school districts from future negli-
gence were invalid as against public policy.' 22 Further, in Hiett v.
Lake Barcrofl Community Ass'n, Inc.,123 the Virginia Supreme Court
116. Bell, supra note 63, at 240 (quoting Kubisen v. Chicago Health Clubs,
388 N.E.2d 44, 46 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)).
117. See Diamond Crystal Salt Co. v. Thielman, 395 F.2d 62, 66 (5th Cir. 1968)
(holding exculpatory agreement signed by parties injured during guided tour of
underground mine was contrary to public policy because plaintiffs could not have
understood risk involved to legally assume it).
118. Roseman-Orr, supra note 47, at 727 (explaining valid exculpatory agree-
ment in Hawaii must show participant knows and comprehends risk involved and
expresses agreement to waive promoter's liability).
119. See Bell, supra note 63, at 241 (noting analysis of exculpatory agreement
considers bargaining power of parties and type of services provided).
120. 758 P.2d 968 (Wash. 1988) (en banc).
121. See Recent Cases, supra note 75, at 730.
122. See Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 973. In determining when an exculpatory
agreement violates public policy, the Washington Supreme Court adopted the six
criteria test introduced in Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal See 383 P.2d 441, 444-
48 (Cal. 1963) (invalidating charitable hospital's requirement that patients release
hospital from liability for future negligence before admittance). The six criteria
for striking down exculpatory agreements under public policy are: (1) "the agree-
ment concerns an endeavor of a type generally thought suitable for public regula-
tion;" (2) "party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great
importance to the public;" (3) "such party holds itself out as willing to perform this
service for any member of the public who seeks it;" (4) "party invoking exculpation
possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength;" (5) "in exercising a supe-
rior bargaining power, the party confronts the public with a standardized adhesion
contract of exculpation, and makes no provision whereby a purchaser may pay
additional reasonable fees and obtain protection against negligence" and (6) "per-
son or property of members of the public seeking such services must be placed
under the control of the furnisher of the services, subject to the risk of carelessness
on the part of the furnisher, its employees or agents." Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 970-
73.
123. 418 S.E.2d 894 (Va. 1992).
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held that a pre-injury release provision signed by the plaintiff prior
to the plaintiff's participation in a triathlon was invalid and prohib-
ited as contrary to public policy. 124 The Virginia Supreme Court
found that "to put the other parties to the contract at the mercy of
its own misconduct.., can never be lawfully done where an enlight-
ened system of jurisprudence prevails."1 25
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's granting of sum-
mary judgment to the hockey player and hockey organizations in
Mohney v. USA Hockey, finding that the team player did not act reck-
lessly or intentionally and the release signed by plaintiffs relieved
the hockey organizations from liability.1 26 The Sixth Circuit, how-
ever, reversed and remanded the district court's granting of sum-
mary judgment in favor of the hockey manufacturers, finding the
language of the release agreement did not relieve the manufactur-
ers from a product liability claim of defective equipment. 127
A. Summary Judgment for Hockey Team Player
In affirming the district court's granting of summary judgment
in favor of the hockey player defendant, the Sixth Circuit relied on
the express assumption of the risk doctrine. 128 In applying Ohio
law, the Sixth Circuit stressed that
124. See id. at 897 (relying on Johnson's Adm'x v. Richmond and Danville
R.R. Co., 11 S.E. 829, 830 (Va. 1890), which held exculpatory clause relieving rail-
road from liability for injuries to workers on adjacent quarry invalid).
125. Id. at 896. In holding that exculpatory releases were prohibited "univer-
sally," the Virginia Supreme Court relied heavily on its 1890 decision, Johnson's
Administrix. See id. In Johnson's Administrix, the Virginia Supreme Court addressed
the question of pre-injury releases of liability for future negligent acts. See id. at
830. The railroad company had its quarry workers sign a pre-injury release, which
absolved the railroad from liability for injury or death resulting from any cause
possible. See id. Thus, the Johnson's Administrix court concluded that public policy
considerations prohibited such exculpatory agreements universally. See id.
126. See Mohney v. USA Hockey, Inc., No. 00-3105, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
3584, at *11-20 (6th Cir. Mar. 1, 2001). Specifically, the Sixth Circuit held that
while the severity of the injury sustained by plaintiff was not a normal occurrence
in hockey, the risk of the injury sustained could have reasonably been expected.
See id. at *17. Further, the Sixth Circuit found that the release agreement signed
by the plaintiffs was valid, and thus, the hockey organizations were not liable for
their actions because they did not act willfully or wantonly. See id. at *19-20.
127. See id. at *20-23. Specifically, the Sixth Circuit found that the district
court had erred in concluding as a matter of law that the hockey manufacturers
were protected from liability under the release agreement as "sponsors" of USA
Hockey. See id. at *20.
128. See id. at *11-17 (relying on Marchetti v. Kalish, 559 N.E.2d 699, 699-700
(Ohio 1990); Thompson v. McNeill, 559 N.E.2d 705, 708 (Ohio 1990)).
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[w] here individuals engage in recreational or sports activi-
ties, they assume the ordinary risks of the activity and can-
not recover for any injury unless it can be shown that the
other participant's actions were either 'reckless' or 'inten-
tional' as defined in sections 500 and 8A of the [RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS].129
The Sixth Circuit found that while the plaintiff's injuries were se-
vere and extraordinary in hockey, the risk of a spinal injury was
reasonably possible. 130 The Sixth Circuit, therefore, held that the
plaintiff assumed the risk of the sport because no reasonable jury
could find that the defendant hockey player performed any con-
duct that would be deemed intentional or reckless. 131
B. Summary Judgment for Hockey Organizations
In affirming the district court's granting of summary judgment
in favor of defendant hockey organizations, the Sixth Circuit relied
on the validity of the release agreement signed by the plaintiffs. 13 2
Under Ohio law, those partaking in a sporting event or recreational
activity are "free to contract with the proprietor 'to relieve the pro-
prietor of responsibility to the participant for the proprietor's negli-
gence, but not for the proprietor's willful or wanton
misconduct."' 33 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the release
signed by the plaintiffs was "clear and unambiguous" and the re-
lease applied to all USA Hockey sponsored events during the 1994-
129. Id. at *11 (quoting Marchetti, 559 N.E.2d at 699). In determining an un-
reasonable risk, as opposed to an ordinary risk, of the activity, the court should
look to the rules and customs of the particular game to determine what constitutes
foreseeable conduct. See id. at *12 (citing Thompson, 559 N.E.2d at 708).
130. See id. at *16. The Ohio Supreme Court has noted that hockey is a dan-
gerous sport in which "injuries are a regular occurrence." Id. at *16 (quoting
Thompson, 559 N.E.2d at 707).
131. See Mohney, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3584, at *17. The Sixth Circuit re-jected plaintiff's contention that the district court erred by substituting its judg-
ment for that of ajury when it concluded that defendant hockey player did not act
recklessly or intentionally. See id. at *16.
132. See id. at *17-19. For an excerpt of the release agreement signed, see
supra note 24.
133. Id. at *13 (quoting Bowen v. Kil-Kare, Inc., 585 N.E.2d 384, 390 (Ohio
1992)). Under Ohio law, "willful misconduct" is "conduct involving an intent, pur-
pose or design to injure;" while "wanton" misconduct is "conduct where one fails
to exercise any care whatsoever toward those to whom he owes a duty of care, and
this failure occurs under circumstances in which there is a great probability that
harm will result." Id. at *13-14 (quoting Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, 696 N.E.2d
201, 207 (Ohio 1998)).
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95 season, including the pre-season and post-season.13 4 In finding
the release valid, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the plaintiffs could
only recover if the hockey organizations' actions constituted willful
or wanton misconduct.13
5
The Sixth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' contention that they
lacked the proper understanding of the contents of the release
agreement. 136 In addition, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argu-
ment that the release agreement should have been declared invalid
because a USA Hockey rule was violated.1 37 Alternatively, the plain-
tiffs asserted that the failure of the hockey organizations to warn
the plaintiffs of the increased spinal injury risk from playing under
touch icing rules was willful and wanton misconduct.1 38 Yet, be-
cause the court could not find evidence in the record that the
hockey organizations acted willfully or wantonly, the valid release
agreement barred the plaintiffs' negligence claims.' 3 9
C. Summary Judgment for Hockey Manufacturers
In reversing and remanding the district court's granting of
summary judgment for the hockey manufacturers, the Sixth Circuit
concluded that the plain language of the release agreement signed
by the plaintiffs did not preclude them from bringing a product
liability claim against the manufacturers for defective equipment. 40
134. See id. at *17. For a discussion of the arguments rejected by the Sixth
Circuit regarding the validity of the release agreement, see infra notes 136-39 and
accompanying text.
135. See id. at *19 (relying on Bowen, 585 N.E.2d at 390).
136. See Mohney, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3584, at *18. Under Ohio law, "[a]
person who signs a contract without making a reasonable effort to know its con-
tents cannot, in the absence of fraud or mutual mistake, avoid the effect of the
contract." Id. (quoting Pippin v. M.A. Hauser Enter., Inc., 676 N.E.2d 932, 937
(Ohio Ct. App. 1996)). Therefore, the plaintiffs are presumed to understand the
contract and cannot claim an inability to understand the agreement to avoid its
effects. See id.
137. See id. at *18-19. Plaintiffs relied on a section of the release agreement
which stated that, "upon entering events sponsored by USA Hockey and/or its
member districts, I/We agree to abide by the Rules of USA Hockey as currently
published." Id. at *18. The Sixth Circuit stressed that this language did not create
a contingency that the validity of the release agreement would hinge on whether
or not one of the rules of USA Hockey was broken. See id at *18-19.
138. See id. at *19. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that
no reasonable jury could find that the hockey organizations' failure to warn of the
risk of spinal injury when playing under touch icing rules was willful and wanton
misconduct. See id.
139. See id. at *20 (citing Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, 696 N.E.2d 201, 207
(Ohio 1998)).
140. See id. The Sixth Circuit held that the protection of the release agree-
ment signed by the plaintiffs did not extend to the hockey manufacturers in their
role as manufacturers. See id. at *23.
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Based on the language of the release agreement, the district court
barred the plaintiffs' product liability claims because the hockey
manufacturers qualified as "sponsors" of USA Hockey.141 The Sixth
Circuit disagreed with the district court's reasoning and found that
the release agreement could not preclude product liability claims
against the hockey manufacturers.1 42 In particular, the court held
that because the hockey manufacturers were not protected by the
release agreement, "the district court erred in considering the valid-
ity of the Mohney's product liability claims under the standard of
willful and wanton misconduct."1 43
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit found that the plaintiffs did not
have a fair chance to establish a genuine issue of material fact for
their product liability claims because of a case management order
imposed. 144 Under the order, the parties were limited to briefing
the issues of "(1) whether Plaintiffs' claims are barred by express
assumption of the risk, and (2) whether Plaintiffs' claims are barred
by primary assumption of the risk."145 The Sixth Circuit concluded
that the district court could not independently adjudicate the prod-
uct liability claims without giving the plaintiffs the chance to dis-
cover and present evidence on these claims. 146 Due to these errors,
the Sixth Circuit remanded to the district court the plaintiffs' prod-
uct liability claims in order to allow them to proceed forward.' 47
V. CRITIcAL ANALYSIS
In Mohney, the Sixth Circuit interpreted Ohio law and applied
the express assumption of the risk doctrine to a valid exculpatory
agreement to preclude liability for all of the hockey defendants ex-
141. See Mohney, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3584, at *20. The release agreement
states in relevant part that participants "release USA Hockey, its Affiliates, their
sponsors, event organizers and officials from liability therefore." Id.
142. See id. at *20. According to the plain language of the release, the Sixth
Circuit concluded that the release agreement does not bar plaintiffs from bringing
a product liability claim against the manufacturer of any equipment deemed defec-
tive. See id.
143. Id. at *23 (holding willful and wanton standard should not have been
applied).
144. See id. at *21. Under the Case Management Conference Order of Oct.
22, 1997, the district court limited the scope of discovery to "the validity, coverage,
and enforceability of the release signed by Plaintiffs Levi Mohney and Timothy
Mohney as to each party, and on the issue of assumption of the risk." Id.
145. Id.
146. See Mohney, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3584, at *23. Specifically, the Sixth
Circuit held that the district court "contravened the parameters imposed by its case
management order" by ruling on the product liability claims without proper dis-
covery. Id. at *23.
147. See id.
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cept the equipment manufacturers. 48 Although the application of
the express assumption of the risk doctrine and the validity of ex-
culpatory agreements was congruous with the current trend of
Ohio law, the factual circumstances of Mohney create inconsisten-
cies and inequities in the court's reasoning.1 49
A. Inappropriate Application of the Express Assumption of the
Risk Doctrine
1. Lack of Awareness of Inherent Risk
Under the doctrine of express assumption of the risk, the par-
ticipant in a sporting event is aware and accepts the risks created by
the sport while contracting away his or her right to a negligence
claim against the proprietor, except for cases of willful or wanton
conduct. 150 A critical factor in determining whether the assump-
tion of the risk doctrine is applicable involves whether the partici-
pant in the sport was aware of and understood the inherent risk. 151
Specifically, in the context of a sporting event, an inherent risk in-
cludes those dangers which are characteristic of the sport.' 52
In Mohney, the Sixth Circuit focused on whether the plaintiffs
injuries were "reasonably anticipated," instead of determining
whether the plaintiff was aware of the inherent risk of the injury
involved. 153 First, the Sixth Circuit recognized that hockey is a dan-
gerous sport in which injuries occur on a regular basis. 154 Then,
the circuit court stressed that although the severity of the injury was
not a regular occurrence in hockey, the risk of such an injury was at
least a reasonable possibility. 55 But the Sixth Circuit failed to ex-
148. See id. at *6.
149. See id. at *11-15; see also Smith, supra note 104, at 712 (noting exculpatory
agreements unenforceable when against public policy).
150. For a discussion of the express assumption of the risk doctrine, see supra
notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
151. For a discussion of the inherent risk aspect of the assumption of the risk
doctrine, see supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
152. See Cooperman v. David, 214 F.3d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding
injury caused by slipping saddle due to loose cinch was inherent risk in horseback
riding); CHAMPION, supra note 44, § 7.6, at 141 (noting participant's subjective
state of mind and knowledge is essential to determine whether participant has
assumed and appreciated risk of sport).
153. See Mohney, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3584, at *17 (affirming grant of sum-
mary judgment for defendant because plaintiff could have reasonably anticipated
injury suffered).
154. See id. at *16 (citing McKichan v. St. Louis Hockey Club, 967 S.W.2d 209,
213 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)).
155. See id. at *17 (holding that unless defendant acted recklessly or inten-
tionally, summary judgment should be granted).
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amine whether the plaintiff actually was aware of the inherent risk
involved and appreciated its unreasonable character. 156 Further-
more, the circuit court failed to examine whether the plaintiff as-
sumed the risks inherent to ice hockey in light of his knowledge
and experience in the sport.157
The trial court described the plaintiff as an "exceptionally
good amateur player," who played in a number of junior hockey
leagues.158 The plaintiff played numerous years of junior ice
hockey under the rules of USA Hockey; therefore, one could rea-
sonably assume that he was aware of the inherent risks of amateur
hockey.159 In Mohney, however, the plaintiff was not injured while
playing under the amateur rules of USA Hockey. 160 Rather, the
plaintiff was injured while playing under the "touch icing" rules of
NHL Hockey.161 Although the plaintiffs goal was to eventually play
ice hockey professionally, he played under the rules of USA Hockey
for the majority of his life and had only limited knowledge and ex-
perience playing under the rules of NHL Hockey. 162
Whether a participant in ice hockey has the requisite aware-
ness of the risk involved should be assessed against the background
and experience of the participant. 163 Generally, a minor's assump-
156. See Wells v. Colo. Coll., 478 F.2d 158, 161 (10th Cir. 1973) (holding as-
sumption of risk doctrine inapplicable because plaintiff did not appreciate ex-
traordinary hazard involved in self-defense class); CHAMPION, supra note 44, §10.1,
at 187 (noting application of assumption of risk doctrine requires participant to
understand and appreciate risk involved).
157. See Habeeb, supra note 38, at 707 (explaining background of partici-
pant's skill and experience considered in application of assumption of risk);
Krivacka & Krivacka, supra note 62, at 677 (noting courts look to participant's age,
experience and intelligence in determing whether participant assumed risk).
158. Mohney v. USA Hockey, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 859, 863 (N.D. Ohio 1999)
(noting Mohney began ice skating at four years of age and began playing ice
hockey at six).
159. See id. (noting Mohney played in numerous traveling junior leagues dur-
ing his adolescent years).
160. See Mohney, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3584, at *4-5 (explaining developmen-
tal camp plaintiff attended chose not to play under automatic icing rule of USA
Hockey).
161. See id. (explaining developmental camp plaintiff attended by Mohney
played under "touch icing" rule of NHL Hockey). For a further discussion of the
"touch icing" rule, see supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
162. See Mohney, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 863 (explaining Mohney dreamed of play-
ing hockey professionally, but his only experience up to time of injury was with
amateur hockey).
163. See Parker v. Ctr. Group Ltd. P'ship, No. 95-1126, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
33694, at *9 (4th Cir. Dec. 4, 1995) (holding higher degree of awareness imputed
to professional rather than amateur sport participant); CHAMPION, supra note 44,
§ 7.6, at 141 (explaining assumption of risk based on subjective state of partici-
pant's mind).
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tion of the risk will be tested according to the minor's maturity and
capacity to evaluate the circumstances around him.16 4 It seems un-
fair to infer that a minor with limited experience playing under the
"touch icing" rule of NHL Hockey would be aware of and appreci-
ate the inherent risk involved in "touch icing," after having played
under the "automatic icing" rule of USA Hockey for most of his
life. 165 The Sixth Circuit never considered whether the plaintiff was
aware of the risk; thus, such a determination should be left to a trier
of fact and not extinguished on a motion for summary judgment. 166
2. Failure to Expressly Assume Inherent Risk
In Mohney, the Sixth Circuit specifically applied the contract-
based express assumption of the risk doctrine. 167 Express assump-
tion of the risk normally involves an exculpatory agreement in
which the participant agrees to relinquish any claim of negligence
against the proprietor. 168 In Mohney, the Sixth Circuit found that
the plaintiff expressly assumed the risks of ice hockey when he and
his parents signed the standard release form upon registering for
the junior hockey league.1 69
The release in question specifically stated that "I/We agree to
abide by the rules of USA Hockey as currently published" in assum-
ing the risk of serious injury in the sport.170 If the plaintiff had
been injured while playing under the "automatic icing" rule of USA
Hockey, the Sixth Circuit could have reasonably concluded that this
express assumption of the risk released the hockey defendants from
164. See McCaskey & Biedzynski, supra note 68, at 46 (explaining due consid-
eration should be given to minor's age, intelligence and experience in applying
assumption of risk).
165. See Bell, supra note 63, at 246 (explaining assumption of unknown risks
should not be inferred); Grazis, supra note 41, at 538 (noting assumption of risk
doctrine requires participant to have actual knowledge of risk and appreciate its
danger).
166. SeeVandervelde v. United States, No. 98-018, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1710,
at *15 (Wyo. Feb. 1, 1999) (holding determination of whether accident caused by
inherent risk is issue of fact for jury and not to be decided on motion for summary
judgment).
167. See Mohney v. USA Hockey, Inc., No. 00-3105, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
3584, at *11-15 (6th Cir. Mar. 1, 2001).
168. For a discussion of express assumption of the risk, see supra notes 49-59
and accompanying text.
169. See Mohney, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3584, at *18-20 (rejecting all of plain-
tifts challenges and holding exculpatory agreement valid).
170. Id. at *6. For the exculpatory agreement contained in the Individual
Membership Registration Form, see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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liability.171 Instead, the plaintiff was injured while abiding by an
entirely different set of rules, specifically the "touch icing" rule of
NHL Hockey.172
Assuming the exculpatory agreement was valid, it would ap-
pear to be unenforceable under the factual situation because the
release is worded in such a way as to limit the express assumption of
the risk to the rules of USA Hockey. 173 The release in Mohney men-
tioned nothing about assuming the risks involved in the sport while
abiding by the rules of NHL Hockey. 174 It is questionable whether
a release that appears to limit liability to the rules of USA Hockey
should preclude liability for injury caused while playing under the
rules of NHL Hockey. 175 It would be unreasonable to hold that a
hockey player is aware of an entirely different set of rules to which
he is not accustomed. 176 At the very least, the question of whether
the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury while playing under NHL
rules, instead of the rules of USA Hockey, should not have been
determined at the summary judgment level. 177
B. Invalid Exculpatory Agreement Enforced
1. Release Unclear and Ambiguous
In Mohney, the Sixth Circuit concluded, as a matter of law, that
the release signed by the plaintiffs prior to the start of the 1994-95
hockey season was a valid exculpatory agreement. 178 First, the Sixth
Circuit concluded that the language of the release was clear and
171. See McPherson v. Sunset Speedway, Inc., 594 F.2d 711, 714-15 (8th Cir.
1979) (holding plaintiff expressly assumed risk of injury by signing release agree-
ment to enter infield area at car race).
172. See Mohney, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *4-5.
173. See Arango & Trueba, supra note 2, at 8 (requiring exculpatory agree-
ment to be clear and unambiguous); Bell, supra note 63, at 239 (noting exculpa-
tory agreement should contain explicit language of circumstances it encompasses).
174. See Mohney, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *6 (noting release nowhere specifi-
cally mentions NHL Hockey).
175. See Arango & Trueba, supra note 2, at 8. The plain language of the re-
lease appears to state clearly that the plaintiffs assume the risk of injury caused
while playing under the rules of USA Hockey. See Mohney, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS,
at *6. But, the plain language of the release does not clearly state that the plaintiff
assumed the risk of injury caused while playing under the rules of NHL Hockey.
See id.
176. See Berman v. Phila. Bd. of Educ., 456 A.2d 545, 549-50 (Pa. Super. 1983)
(holding minor did not assume risk of floor hockey because he did not appreciate
risks due to lack of experience).
177. SeeVandervelde v. United States, No. 98-018, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1710,
at *15 (Wyo. Feb. 1, 1999) (holding inherent risk is issue of fact forjury determina-
tion, not summary judgment).
178. See Mohney, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3584, at *17.
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unambiguous. 179 Specifically, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the
release was clear and unambiguous in not limiting its application to
the 1994-95 regular season, but included events such as the devel-
opmental camp.
180
In order to be enforceable, an exculpatory agreement should
"contain clear, explicit, and unequivocal language referencing the
types of activities, circumstances or situations that it encom-
passes." 18 The release may be clear and unambiguous to a partici-
pant agreeing to abide by the rules of USA Hockey, but the release
is unclear and ambiguous as to whether the rules not sanctioned by
USA Hockey will be used in the league.'8 2 In particular, the release
is silent and unclear about whether a participant assumes the risk of
injury as a result of abiding by the rules of NHL Hockey.'8 3 As a
result, the release fails to be clear and explicit in all of its essential
details. 1 4 The exculpatory agreement, therefore, appears to be un-
enforceable because of a failure to be clear and unambiguous
about problems that may arise while playing under the rules of
NHL Hockey.' 8 5
In Mohney, the Sixth Circuit also concluded that the plaintiffs
could not invalidate the exculpatory agreement by claiming lack of
179. See id.
180. See id. (noting exculpatory agreement applied to pre-season and post-
season events for the hockey league).
181. Bell, supra note 63, at 239. For a further discussion of the enforceability
of exculpatory agreements, see supra notes 71-127 and accompanying text.
182. See Anderson v. Eby, 998 F.2d 858, 865 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that
meaning of ambiguous contract terms is issue of fact to be determined in same way
as other factual issues under dispute); Fasules v. D.D.B. Needham Worldwide, Inc.,
No. 89-1078, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10573, at *15-16 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 1989) (hold-
ing failure to warn and make plaintiff aware of risks of whitewater rafting at time
agreement was signed rendered ambiguous exculpatory agreement unenforce-
able); Bell, supra note 63, at 239 (noting exculpatory agreement should explicitly
state types of activities encompassed).
183. See Mohney, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3584, at *6 (explaining that plaintiffs
agreed to abide by rules of USA Hockey, not rules of NHL Hockey).
184. See RIFFER, supra note 3, § 10.01, at 516 n.12 (noting exculpatory agree-
ment must be written in clear and understandable words).
185. See Anderson, 998 F.2d at 865 (holding that meaning of ambiguous con-
tract terms is issue of fact to be determined in same way as other factual issues
under dispute); Ghionis v. Deer Valley Resort Co., Ltd., 839 F. Supp. 789, 793-94
(C.D. Utah 1993) (holding scope and language of ski resort exculpatory agree-
ment ambiguous); Fasules, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10573, at *15-16 (holding ambig-
uous whitewater rafting exculpatory agreement unenforceable).
The injured plaintiff agreed "to abide by the rules of USA Hockey as currently
published." Mohney, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3584, at *6. When the plaintiff was
injured, the rules of NHL Hockey were in place; however, the release was silent as
to the applicability of these rules. See id.
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understanding of the release's contents.1 86 The Sixth Circuit
stressed that a person who signs a contract without making an at-
tempt to understand its contents cannot avoid the later effect of the
contract. 8 7 Even if the plaintiffs clearly understood the effects of
the release when signed, they still would not have known the effects
of the release involving NHL Hockey rules, instead of the USA
Hockey rules that were clearly mentioned in the release. 188 As a
result, it is difficult to presume the plaintiff understood the con-
tract that was silent on the applicability of NHL Hockey rules. 189
Finally, the Sixth Circuit found that the validity of the exculpa-
tory agreement was unaffected by the possible violation of a USA
Hockey rule. 90 The Sixth Circuit found that the validity of the re-
lease did not depend on an infraction of the USA Hockey rules, but
instead focused on whether the risk of slamming into the boards
and suffering injury was reasonably anticipated. 191 From this argu-
ment, the court appears to be focusing on whether a penalty, as
defined by the rules of USA Hockey, should have been called on
the play that injured plaintiff.' 92 Such a focus, however, is unneces-
sary because the play that injured the plaintiff involved an entirely
different icing rule under the rules of NHL Hockey. 193 The validity
of the release should not turn on whether there was an infraction of
the USA Hockey rules, but rather whether the plaintiff assumed the
risk of an entirely different set of rules. 94 Slamming into the
boards may be a regular occurrence in hockey, but slamming into
the boards under touch icing rules in an amateur hockey game is
186. See Mohney, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3584, at *18 (noting plaintiffs later
claimed to not understand terms of contract signed).
187. See id. (citing Pippin v. M.A. Hauser Enters., Inc., 676 N.E.2d 932, 937
(Ohio Ct. App. 1996)).
188. See Fasules, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10573, at *14-16 (holding exculpatory
agreement unenforceable because of its failure to mention risks involved in white-
water rafting).
189. See id. (illustrating importance of person knowing risks involved before
enforcement of exculpatory agreement).
190. See Mohney, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3584, at *18.
191. See id. at *18-19 (relying on Thompson v. McNeill, 559 N.E.2d 705, 708
(Ohio 1990)).
192. See Mohney v. USA Hockey, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 859, 876 (N.D. Ohio
1999) (determining court not qualified to determine whether penalty should have
been called).
193. See Mohney, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3584, at *4-5.
194. See Fasules, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10573, at *15-16 (holding failure to
make participant aware of risks involved in whitewater rafting rendered ambiguous
exculpatory agreement unenforceable).
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not a regular occurrence because amateur hockey games are played
under automatic icing rules. 195
2. Enforceability of Exculpatoy Agreements Against Minors
The Sixth Circuit concluded that parents have the authority to
bind their minor children to exculpatory agreements.1 96 Ohio has
taken the minority position that parents are capable of waiving a
minor's claim with an exculpatory agreement.1 97 The majority of
jurisdictions have abided by the established rule that minors cannot
waive their rights even if the exculpatory agreement is clear and
unambiguous.1 98 Ohio's delineation from this established rule is
unfounded and unnecessary. 199
Mohney is almost identical to Santangelo v. New York, in which a
minor at an ice hockey clinic was injured.20 However, the
Santangelo court refused to enforce the release signed by the mi-
nor's father that exempted the city and hockey league from liability
for the minor's injuries.20 1 The Sixth Circuit's enforcement of the
exculpatory agreement in Mohney is clearly against settled law in
which parents have no authority to release a cause of action belong-
ing to their child.20 2
195. See Mohney, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3584, at *17; see also USA HocKE'
RULES R. 65(a).
196. See Mohney, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3584, at *14 (relying on Zivich v. Men-
tor Soccer Club, 696 N.E.2d 201, 201 (Ohio 1998)).
197. See Smith, supra note 104, at 716. But see RIFFER, supra note 3, § 10.03, at
523 (indicating jurisdictions nearly unanimous in holding that parent's signing of
exculpatory agreement on behalf of child does not prevent child from suing).
198. See Scott v. Pac. W. Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 11 (Wash. 1992) (hold-
ing exculpatory agreement unenforceable against minor who was advanced skier);
Childress v. Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1, 8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (holding ex-
culpatory agreement signed by mother waived her rights, but not the minor's
rights); Doyle v. Bowdoin Coll., 403 A.2d 1204, 1209 (Me. 1979) (holding release
signed by parent of floor hockey player unenforceable because parent cannot
waive rights of minor).
199. See CHAMPION, supra note 44, § 11.5, at 213-14 (noting contracts with mi-
nors are voidable unless they involve necessities of life).
200. See Santangelo v. New York, 411 N.Y.S.2d 666, 667 (1978) (holding mi-
nor injured at ice hockey clinic not bound by release signed by father exempting
city and hockey league from liability for injuries).
201. See id. (noting release unenforceable against minor despite fact that par-
ent signed release on minor's behalf).
202. See BALEr & MAi-rHEWS, supra note 42, at 56 (noting under traditional
rule of contract, neither child nor parent of child can waive rights of child).
2002]
29
Seiberling: Icing on the Cake: Allowing Amateur Athletic Promoters to Escape
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
446 VILLANovA SPORTS & ENr. LAw JouRNAL
3. Exculpatory Agreement Contrary to Public Policy
The Sixth Circuit did not address whether the exculpatory
agreement was invalid as against public policy.203 Although the cir-
cuit court failed to address this issue, the district court held that the
exculpatory agreement was not contrary to public policy.20 4 The
circuit court's failure to consider the public policy argument is
unsubstantiated. 205
The notion of public policy is a "principle of law which de-
clares that no one may lawfully do that which has a tendency to be
injurious to the public welfare. '20 6 As the plaintiffs argued in Moh-
ney, USA Hockey is the national governing body for amateur ice
hockey and should be held accountable for its actions. 20 7 Allowing
the national governing body of ice hockey to escape liability for
negligent behavior would clearly be injurious to the public wel-
fare.20 8 A large, national organization that spans across the entire
United States should not be able to escape liability for its negligent
creation of unsafe conditions.20 9 Such a national governing body
should be held to the utmost standards of safety to ensure that jun-
ior hockey players do not encounter greater risks of injury. 210
The Washington Supreme Court's findings prove influential
and analogous to Mohney in dealing with exculpatory agreements
203. See Mohney v. USA Hockey, Inc., No. 00-3105, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
3584, at *17-19 (6th Cir. Mar. 1, 2001).
204. See Mohney v. USA Hockey, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 859, 875 (N.D. Ohio
1999) (relying on Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, 696 N.E.2d 201, 205 (Ohio 1998),
holding exculpatory agreement signed by minor's parent bars later suit suing non-
profit sports organization for injuries); see also Smith, supra note 104, at 713 (ex-
plaining Zivich court wrongly focused on whether public policy justified
enforcement of release instead of whether release was void as matter of public
policy).
205. See Smith, supra note 104, at 712 (noting public policy has been focal
point in determining validity of exculpatory agreements).
206. Bell, supra note 63, at 240. For a further discussion of the public policy
implications of exculpatory agreements, see supra notes 115-25 and accompanying
text.
207. See Mohney, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 875. At the trial court level, the plaintiffs
argued that the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Zivich should not support a
holding in which USA Hockey is released from liability because USA Hockey has a
statutory duty to encourage the active dissemination of information in sports
safety. See id.
208. See Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist., 758 P.2d 968, 970 (Wash. 1988)
(holding exculpatory agreement relieving school district from future negligence
violated public policy),
209. See Mohney, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 875. The plaintiffs attempted to distinguish
the national governing body status of USA Hockey from the small, local soccer
club in Zivich. See id.
210. See id. USA Hockey has "a statutory duty to encourage the dissemination
of information in the area of sports safety" under 36 U.S.C. § 392(a) (9). Id.
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and public policy. 211 In Wagenblast, the Washington Supreme Court
held that releases relieving school districts from future negligence
violated public policy.21 2 Similar to Mohney, the children in Wagen-
blast were required to execute the exculpatory agreement before
they were allowed to participate in the interscholastic athletic pro-
gram.21 3 Principles of fairness and increased safety proffer that the
Mohney court should have at least considered the signed exculpa-
tory agreement as being in violation of public policy.21 4
VI. IMPACT
Mohney represents a case that could have drastic, negative ef-
fects on the safety of amateur athletics. Amateur athletes in all
sports may now face a presumption that they assume the risks in-
volved at the amateur level and the professional level of the
sport.2 1 5 Professional sports are by their nature more dangerous,
and rules are in place to reduce this danger at the amateur level.
USA Hockey was aware that the automatic icing rule of amateur
hockey would be safer than the more dangerous touch icing rule of
professional hockey.216 Yet, in Mohney, an amateur hockey player
was held to have expressly assumed the risk of injury as if he was a
professional hockey player playing under NHL rules.217 Levi Moh-
ney had never played a single professional hockey game in his life,
but the Sixth Circuit found that he assumed the risk of injury as if
he had played under NHL Hockey rules his entire life.2 18
By finding the exculpatory agreement in Mohney valid, the
Sixth Circuit is expanding the enforceability of these instruments
contrary to public policy.219 Allowing the national governing body
211. See Wagenblast, 758 P.2d at 973 (holding exculpatory agreement relieving
school district from liability for interscholatic athletics unenforceable).
212. See id. at 970 (noting court applied the six-factor Tunki test in concluding
exculpatory agreement violated public policy).
213. See id. at 969 (noting participation required parent and student to sign
exculpatory agreements).
214. See also Hiett v. Lake Barcroft Cmty. Assoc., Inc., 418 S.E.2d 894, 897 (Va.
1992) (holding pre-injury release signed by triathlete contrary to public policy).
215. See Parker Centre Group Ltd. P'ship, No. 95-1126, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
33694, at *9 (4th Cir. Dec. 4, 1995) (noting higher degree of awareness is generally
imputed for professional athletes than amateur athletes).
216. See Mohney, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 864 (noting touch icing prohibited below
Junior B level hockey because of increased risk of player injury).
217. See id. (explaining Mohney only played under touch icing rule at two
prior developmental camps and his only real familiarity with touch icing came
from watching NHL Hockey games).
218. See id.
219. For a discussion of the public policy implications of exculpatory agree-
ments, see supra notes 115-25 and accompanying text.
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of amateur hockey to escape liability under a questionable exculpa-
tory clause will not improve the safety of an already dangerous
sport.220 Negligence could go unchecked among amateur sports
where parents at least assume their children are being properly su-
pervised and not being subjected to unnecessary dangers that are
not inherent to the sport.22 1 Parents who drop their children off
for practice may not feel as comfortable for their safety if the ama-
teur league and its affiliates cannot be held accountable. Safety
should be a primary concern for all of amateur athletics and al-
lowing negligence to hide behind the guise of an exculpatory
agreement does not promote a safer atmosphere for the nation's
youth.
Mark Seiberling
220. See BALMY & MATrHEWS, supra note 42, at 56 (noting exculpatory agree-
ments provide little incentive for promoters to actively prevent negligence).
221. For a discussion of the inherent risk in sporting activities, see supra notes
60-70 and accompanying text.
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